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Within the economic, information, military, and political sciences the study of conict often
examines environments in which the outcome of a given conict is determined by performance
in multiple component conicts or \battleelds." In most studies linkages exist between the
component conicts that require study as an overall system. In this survey we examine
conicts comprised of component conicts that are winner-take-all contests. That is, one
of the two parties in the component conict (players) wins the component conict and the
other loses. Examples of such conicts include: (i) product innovation, which often involves
procuring a collection of interrelated patents, (ii) counterterrorism eorts and information
systems security, which involve the defense of complex networks of dierent targets, each
of which may be viewed as a battleeld, and (iii) presidential campaigns, which involve
competing to win a majority of the votes within each state in a combination of states that
results in an Electoral College victory. In each of these examples behavior and payos
across the complete set of contests depend on the structural linkages between the individual
contests. These linkages arise from economies or diseconomies in how battleeld outcomes
and costs aggregate in determining performance in the overall conict and may depend on
the technology of conict within each battleeld.
Structural linkages may be symmetric across players, as in presidential campaigns or
product innovation, where the players share the same objective of securing any one of the
winning combinations of contests { either a combination of states that wins the Electoral
College or a combination of patents that result in the innovation. Conversely, structural
linkages may be asymmetric across players, such as the weakest-link and best-shot objectives
arising in the defense against terrorism, in which the loss of any single target may be sucient
to create a spectacular terrorism event but the entire collection of targets must be defended
in order to prevent such an event.
Conicts involving multiple component contests with structural linkages play a prominent
role in the history of game theory. In one of the rst problems examined in modern game
theory, Borel (1921) introduced a foundational model of multiple contests with linkages.
Borel's formulation, known as the Colonel Blotto game, is a constant-sum game involving two
players who must each allocate a xed amount of a resource over a nite number of contests.
Each player must distribute their resource without knowing their opponent's distribution of
the resource. In each contest, the player who allocates the higher level of the resource wins,
and the payo for the whole game is a function of the sum of the wins across the individual
contests. This particular game, which highlights the role of budget constraints as a structural
1linkage, was a focal point in the early game theory literature and captured the attention of
prominent scholars across a range of disciplines (see, for example, Bellman 1969; Blackett
1954, 1958; Gross and Wagner 1950; Shubik and Weber 1981; Tukey 1949). The Colonel
Blotto game has also experienced a recent resurgence of interest (see, for example, Golman
and Page 2009; Hart 2008; Kovenock and Roberson 2008a, 2009; Kvasov 2007; Laslier 2002;
Laslier and Picard 2002; Roberson 2006, 2008; Weinstein 2005). One of the primary appeals
of the Colonel Blotto game is that it provides a unied theoretical framework that sheds light
on a host of important issues in a broad set of environments. Most of the models examined
in this chapter may be viewed as variants and extensions of Borel's original theme.
We focus on conicts in which the payo to each of two risk-neutral players is given by the
dierence between an \objective" function | which aggregates the outcomes (wins or losses)
in the individual component contests into the total benet from engaging in the conict |
and a cost function | which aggregates the eorts allocated to the individual component
contests into a total cost of eort for the conict. We divide our analysis into two parts
corresponding to whether the linkages across battleelds arise through the aggregation of
battleeld outcomes (objective-side linkages) or in the aggregation of battleeld costs (cost-
side linkages). On the cost side we examine structural linkages such as budget constraints and
investments which provide a uniform level of force across all of the component contests, which
we call \infrastructure investments." On the objective side we examine several objectives
in which the benet from engaging in the conict is measured by some function of the sum
of the values of battleelds won. This includes objectives which measure the benet as the
sum itself, as well as objectives in which a positive benet accrues only if the sum reaches
some critical value, for example half the total value at stake.
In addition to breaking down our analysis according to the nature of the linkages across
contests, we also divide the analysis according to the type of contest success function (CSF)
employed in each battleeld contest. The CSF maps the players' resource expenditures
in a contest into their respective probabilities of winning the contest. We focus on two
types of CSFs, chosen both because of their prominence in the literature and the contrasting
emphasis each places on the role of random noise in determining the contest outcome. Under
the auction contest success function the player with the larger resource expenditure within
the battleeld wins the battleeld with certainty. Under the lottery contest success function
the probability that a player wins the battleeld is equal to the ratio of the player's resource
expenditure to the sum of the players' expenditures within the battleeld.
The auction CSF may be viewed as capturing environments in which random noise plays
2little role in determining the contest outcome. Alternatively, it may be viewed as representing
a modeling strategy in which all factors inuencing the contest outcome are captured in the
model and unmodeled factors play little or no role. Because the auction CSF is discontinuous
when players have the same expenditure, small dierences in resources expended may lead
to large dierences in the probability of winning. The auction CSF thereby represents
cutthroat competition in sunk expenditure. In single battleeld contests employing the
auction CSF generally leads to the nonexistence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium and
requires nondegenerate mixed strategies in equilibrium. Our analysis shows that this feature
of contests with the auction CSF carries over to multibattleeld contests, where mixed
strategies are multivariate joint distribution functions. In examining such strategies, we
focus attention on both the randomization in resources allocated to each battleeld and how
structural linkages across battleelds lead to behavioral linkages in the form of endogenous
correlation structures in the players' joint distributions.
The lottery CSF is perhaps the most popular method for modeling single battleeld
contests. Under the lottery CSF expenditure by the two players may be interpreted as the
purchase of lottery tickets, where a random draw from the outstanding tickets determines
the winner. One consequence of the random noise that persists conditional on the players'
expenditures is that under the lottery CSF competition is softened relative to the auction
CSF. Under standard cost assumptions, the lottery CSF yields a concave payo function in
single battleeld contests leading, in turn, to the existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. Our analysis shows that this feature of contests with the lottery CSF generally carries
over to multibattleeld conicts. However, there are examples of structural linkages that
generate nonquasiconcave objectives and therefore require mixed strategies in equilibrium.
Section 2 introduces the formal framework used in this chapter. This includes the speci-
cation of payos in terms of objective functions and cost functions and the determination of
battleeld outcomes. Our treatment of the objective and cost functions includes an outline of
the structural linkages that are the focus of our analysis. Section 3 examines the behavioral
linkages arising from cost-side linkages, and Section 4 examines the behavioral linkages aris-
ing from objective-side linkages. Section 5 concludes by discussing extensions and pointing
to areas for future research, including alternative contest success functions, n-player versions
of the models, incomplete information, dynamics, and empirical evaluation.
32 Conict with Multiple Battleelds
Consider two players, A and B; competing in a conict consisting of n battleelds. The two
players simultaneously expend nonnegative n-tuples of a (sunk) resource, xi = (xi;1;:::;xi;n);
i 2 fA;Bg, where xi;j is the allocation of the resource (or allocation of force) by player i
to battleeld j. If the two players allocate xA;j and xB;j to battleeld j, then each player's
outcome in battleeld j, vi;j(xi;j;x i;j; e !j), i 2 fA;Bg, is a real-valued function of the
allocations (xA;j;xB;j) and the realization of a real-valued random variable e !j; where it is
assumed that the random variables e !1; e !2;:::; e !n are independent. The total benet to player
i from engaging in the multi-battleeld conict is assumed to be a real-valued function of the
player's respective battleeld outcomes, vi(vi;1(xi;1;x i;1; e !1);:::;vi;n(xi;n;x i;n; e !n)), which
we call player i's objective function. The cost of player i's vector of expenditures is given by
ci(xi). We assume that each player is a risk neutral expected payo maximizer and that the
expected payo of an arbitrary player A is the expected benet minus the cost:1
UA(xA;xB)  E(vA(vA;1(xA;1;xB;1; e !1);:::;vA;n(xA;n;xB;n; e !n)))   cA(xA)
= VA (xA;xB)   cA(xA)
(1)
Before investigating the linkages across battleelds that arise from the objective and cost
functions, we rst examine the determination of battleeld outcomes.
2.1 Battleeld Outcomes
The focus of this chapter is on conicts comprised of battleelds that are winner-take-all
contests. That is, for any given (xA;j;xB;j;!j) exactly one of the two players \wins" the
battleeld and the other \loses," with battleeld outcomes that are explicitly dependent on
the event of winning or losing. As described below we focus on a formulation of the contest
in which, for any given (xA;j;xB;j) pair, the value of the random variable e !j determines only
the identity of the winner, and not the values of the battleeld contingent on winning or
losing. In this formulation, (xi;j;x i;j;!j) 2 Wi;j(W i;j) indicates that given the resource
levels xi;j and x i;j and the realization !j of the random varible e !j player i( i) is the winner
(and therefore player  i(i) the loser) in battleeld j. Within component contest j, we may
1If the players are not risk neutral, an arbitrary player A would maximize a nonane function of
vA(vA;1(xA;1;xB;1; e !1);:::;vA;n(xA;n;xB;n; e !n))   cA(xA); and payos would no longer be separable in the
objective and cost. This creates a dierent, but interesting, set of behavioral linkages across battleelds that
are not examined in this chapter.
4dene pA;j(xA;j;xB;j) = Pr((xA;j;xB;j;!j) 2 WA;j) to be the probability that player A wins
the component contest j conditional on the two players' expenditures in the contest and
pB;j(xA;j;xB;j) = 1  pA;j(xA;j;xB;j) to be the corresponding probability that player B wins
the component contest. Consistent with popular usage, we will refer to pi;j(xA;j;xB;j) as the
contest success function for battleeld j.
In the sections that follow we will restrict ourselves to independent random variables
e !1; e !2;:::; e !n which generate one of the following two contest success functions (commonly
known as the \auction" and \lottery" contest success functions), independently across each
battleeld:





1 if xA;j > xB;j
IC if xA;j = xB;j
0 if xA;j < xB;j




xA;j+xB;j if (xA;j;xB;j) 6= (0;0)
1
2 if (xA;j;xB;j) = (0;0)
For each player i 2 fA;Bg we attach to each battleeld j a battleeld specic value to
winning, wi;j > 0, and a battleeld specic value to losing, li;j, that are independent of the
expenditures (xA;j;xB;j) and the realized value of !j. To facilitate the exposition, we further
assume that li;1 = ::: = li;n = 0, so that vA;j(xA;j;xB;j;!j) takes on a value 0 or wA;j > 0.
We may therefore write
vA;j(xA;j;xB;j;!j) =
(
wA;j if (xA;j;xB;j;!j) 2 WA;j
0 if (xA;j;xB;j;!j) = 2 WA;j
2.2 Objective Functions
When analyzing the aggregation of battleeld outcomes we examine count objectives | that
is, objectives for which the total benet from the overall conict is measured by some function
of the sum of the values of battleelds won. More formally, let If(xA;j;xB;j;!j)2WA;jg denote
2Ic in this formulation refers to an indicator that depends on the particular model of conict being
examined. Often, in games with discontinuous payos, such as winner-take-all contests with an auction
contest success function, the modeler must employ a judicious choice of a tie-breaking rule in order to avoid
having to revert to the use of "-equilibrium concepts.
5the indicator function that takes the value 1 if player A is a winner, (xA;j;xB;j;!j) 2 WA;j;
and 0 otherwise. Player A is said to have a count objective if there exists a function f such







There are two prominent types of count objectives that will be examined in this chapter, the
linear count objective and the critical-value count objective. Under a linear count objective,





In this formulation, a player maximizes the expected sum of the values of battleelds won











In this case, if the sum of the values of the battleelds that player A wins is at least mA,
then he earns a constant wA > 0 before netting out the cost of all expenditures. Otherwise,
player A earns nothing and loses his costs.
We will often focus on the case in which all battleelds won are of equal individual value,
normalized to 1, i.e. wA;1 = ::: = wA;n = 1. Under this normalization, the sum of the values




i=1 If(xA;j;xB;j;!j)2WA;jg. A count objective satisfying this restriction is labeled a pure-count
objective, and the two types of count objectives given in equations (2) and (3) are referred
to as the linear pure-count objective and the critical-value pure-count objective respectively.
Three special cases of critical-value pure-count objectives that are examined in this chap-
ter are the cases of a majoritarian objective, where, for n odd, mA = n
2; a weakest-link
objective, where mA = n; and a best-shot objective where mA = 1:
It should be emphasized that the models we examine will generally feature some type
of count objective, but these may or may not be identical across the two players. So, for
instance, in the next two sections we will examine games in which (i) both players have
6linear count or linear pure-count objectives, (ii) both players have majoritarian objectives,
and (iii) one player has a weakest-link objective and the other a best-shot objective.
2.3 Cost Functions
In the multi-battleeld conicts that we examine, the cost function cA(xA) may or may not
be additively separable in battleeld expenditures. If the function is additively separable, it
takes the form cA(xA) = cA;1(xA;1) + ::: + cA;n(xA;n), where the total cost of the allocation
xA is the sum of the costs of the battleeld specic allocations. One special case that will be
used in the continuation is the case of identical battleeld specic cost functions of a linear
form, cA(xA) = c  (xA;1 + ::: + xA;n), where c > 0: We refer to this as the case of linear
costs. Two types of nonseparable cost functions will be employed in the following sections.






c  (xA;1 + ::: + xA;n) if (xA;1 + ::: + xA;n)  BA
1 (xA;1 + ::: + xA;n) > BA
:
Here, BA has the interpretation of a resource or budget constraint on a one dimensional
resource that is allocated across the n battleelds, where this resource has a constant op-
portunity cost of use elsewhere of c: A special case used in the classical Colonel Blotto game
is the case where each unit of the resource up to the budget constraint has a zero oppor-
tunity cost, c = 0; so that the resource budget is use-it-or-lose-it. We refer to this case as
budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs.
The second nonseparable cost function that will be examined is the case of a multi-
battleeld cost function arising from the inclusion of an infrastructure investment. By in-
frastructure investment, we mean a nontargetable technology that provides a uniform allo-
cation of a resource across all battleelds. A natural way to think of such an investment is
as one that is a \public good" in the sense that it provides an input of the resource that
is nonrival across all battleelds. For instance, in a military setting, a xed investment in
an innovative weapons system or a high-tech command and control center may be applied
across all battleelds simultaneously at the same cost that it might be applied to a subset
of battleelds.
In our treatment, we assume that the resource corresponding to an investment in infras-
tructure serves as a perfect substitute for the targetable resource in each battleeld. This
7assumption allows us to treat the sum of player i's infrastructure investment and his tar-
geted resource to a given battleeld j as a single choice variable b xi;j, which we call player
i's eective force allocation to battleeld j. It is this allocation that enters into the contest
success function for that battleeld.
If in addition the (constant) per unit cost, cu, of the infrastructure investment is less than
the cost per unit, nc, of allocating the targetable resource uniformly across all n battleelds,
cost minimization implies that we can write the cost function as:
cA(b xA) = c  ((b xA;1   min
j
b xA;j) + ::: + (b xA;n   min
j
b xA;j)) + cu  min
j
b xA;j:
As is clear from the formulation, it is cost minimizing to employ the infrastructure investment
to provide all units up to the minimum eective force allocation across battleelds, with the
dierence between this minimum eective force allocation and the allocation in any other
given battleeld being met by the targetable resource. We refer to this case as infrastructure
costs.3
2.4 Multi-Battle Conict with Structural Linkages
Before outlining the structural linkages examined in this chapter, it is useful to make the
following straightforward observation: If each player i = A;B has a linear count objective
and an additively separable cost function, then each player i's expected payo may be
written as [Evi;1(xi;1;x i;1;!1)   ci;1(xi;1)] + ::: + [Evi;n(xi;n;x i;n;!n)   ci;n(xi;n)]: In this
case, maximizing the expected payo in the overall conict is equivalent to maximizing
the expected payo in each battleeld contest separately, Evi;j(xi;j;x i;j;!j)   ci;j(xi;j),
j = 1;::;n. Solving for a Nash equilibrium in the multi-battleeld conict reduces to the
simultaneous solution of n independent single-input winner-take-all contests. Lemma 1 states
this formally.
Lemma 1. If each player i = A;B has a linear count objective and an additively separable
cost function then maximizing the expected payo for the overall conict, given in equation
(1), is equivalent to maximizing the expected payo, Evi;j(xi;j;x i;j;!j)   ci;j(xi;j); in each
battleeld contest separately.
In the pages that follow, we detail the intricate linkages between contests that arise in
3Because an infrastructure investment, by denition, raises all battleeld allocations by the amount of
the investment, the existence of a cost ecient infrastructure investment yields a cost function which may
be decreasing over regions of the domain of battleeld allocations.
8cases where either there is a deviation from the assumption of a linear count objective or the
cost function is not additively separable. The layout of this chapter is as follows. In section
3 we examine cost-side linkages in games with linear count and pure-count objectives and
nonseperable cost functions. Subsection 3.1 examines the behavioral linkages arising from a
budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it cost function. Under the auction CSF, the combination
of a linear pure-count objective and symmetric budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs
yields the classic Colonel Blotto game due to Borel. Extensions of this model to the case of
asymmetric budget constraints (Roberson 2006) and, in subsection 3.2, budget-constrained
linear costs (Kvasov 2007, Roberson and Kvasov 2008) are treated. We also present a class
of models, due to Friedman (1958) and Robson (2005), that address the same issues but
employ the lottery contest success function in each component contest. We end the section
by examining the case of an infrastructure investment.
In section 4 we investigate objective-side linkages. In subsection 4.1 we examine the
majoritarian objective with linear costs and briey discuss the case of budget-constrained
use-it-or-lose-it costs. An approach to this problem with a generalization of the lottery con-
test success function and a linear cost function is examined by Snyder (1989) and Klumpp
and Polborn (2006). The problem of a majoritarian objective assuming an auction con-
test success function and budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs was rst addressed by
Borel and Ville (1938), who examine the case of three battleelds.4 Szentes and Rosenthal
(2003a) solve for an equilibrium under a majoritarian objective with three battleelds and
linear costs, and Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b) examine equilibria of games with more than
three battleelds and linear costs in which players must achieve the same supermajority of
battleeld victories.
Subsection 4.2 looks at the case in which one of the players has a best-shot objective
and his opponent a weakest-link objective. For the lottery contest success function, an
equilibrium for this case is provided by Clark and Konrad (2007). For the auction contest
success function, an equilibrium (in nondegenerate mixed strategies) and properties satised
by any equilibrium are provided by Kovenock and Roberson (2009). In subsection 4.3, we
briey examine extensions in which the expenditure of resources across multiple battleelds
contributes to the construction of aggregate measures of resource allocation that map the
vector of battleeld allocations to the real line. Success or failure in the conict is then a
(potentially stochastic) function of the two players' aggregate measures.
4See also Laslier (2003) who allows the three battleelds to have dierent weights.
93 Multiple Battleelds with Cost Linkages
We begin in section 3.1 with linear count and pure-count objectives and examine the link-
ages that arise from budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs. In section 3.2 we extend the
analysis to budget-constrained linear costs and, in section 3.3, infrastructure costs.
3.1 Budget-Constrained Use-It-Or-Lose-It Costs
Borel's Colonel Blotto game | an auction battleeld contest success function, linear pure-
count objective, and budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs | highlights the nature of the
battleeld linkages arising from a constraint on the sum of additively separable battleeld
expenditures. In the Colonel Blotto game each of the two players has a resource constraint
(or budget). Let A denote the strong player with resource constraint BA, and B denote the
weak player with resource constraint BB, where BA  BB. For player i, the set of feasible












Although, Theorem 1 below can be extended to allow for heterogenous battleeld valu-
ations,5 we will focus on the simplest case in which all battleelds are of equal individual
value, normalized to 1 (i.e., wi;j = 1 for i = A;B and all j). The total value of battleelds
contested in the Colonel Blotto game is then n. Each player's objective is to maximize the
expected number of individual battleelds won.
In each battleeld, or component contest, j, the probability that player i wins battleeld
j with an allocation of force xi;j when player  i allocates x i;j units of force is determined by
the auction CSF. Consequently, for any feasible n-tuple of force allocations xi 2 Si, player





where pi;j(xA;j;xB;j) denotes the auction CSF.
5For the case of symmetric resource constraints, BA = BB, see Laslier (2002). For asymmetric resource
constraints (BA > BB) Theorem 1 can be extended to allow the battleeld valuations to vary across the
individual component contests as long as for each distinct battleeld valuation there are at least three
battleelds with that valuation.
10If the strong player (A) has sucient resources to outbid the weaker player's (B's) max-
imal force allocation on all n battleelds (i.e., if BA  nBB) then there, trivially, exists
a pure strategy equilibrium, and the strong player (A) wins all of the battleelds.6 It is
well known that for the remaining parameter congurations, (1=n)BA < BB  BA, there
is no pure strategy equilibrium for this class of games. A mixed strategy, which we term
a distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate distribution function Pi : Rn
+ ! [0;1]
with support (denoted Supp(Pi)) contained in player i's set of feasible force allocations Si
and with the set of one-dimensional marginal distribution functions fFi;jgn
j=1, one univariate
marginal distribution function for each battleeld j. The n-tuple of player i's allocation of
force to each of the n battleelds is a random n-tuple drawn from the n-variate distribution
function Pi.
Optimal Strategies
Theorem 1 summarizes Roberson's (2006) characterization of equilibrium in the Colonel
Blotto game in the case that n  3 and BB=BA satises (2=n) < (BB=BA)  1. See
Roberson (2006) for the remaining case with n  3 and (1=n) < (BB=BA)  (2=n). The case
of n = 2 is dealt with in Gross and Wagner (1950) and Macdonell and Mastronardi (2009).
The following result holds for a range of tie-breaking rules, including fair randomization
(IC = (1=2)).
Theorem 1 (Roberson (2006)). If n  3 and BB=BA satises (2=n) < (BB=BA)  1, then
the pair of n-variate distribution functions P 
A and P 
B constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
Colonel Blotto game (i.e., auction CSF, linear pure-count objective, and budget-constrained
use-it-or-lose-it costs) if and only if it satises the following two conditions: (1) For each
player i, Supp(P 
i )  Si and (2) P 
i , i = A;B, provide the corresponding unique set of
univariate marginal distribution functions fF 
i;jgn
j=1 outlined below.




































Moreover, such strategies exist, and in any Nash equilibrium the expected payo of the weak
player (B) is n(BB=2BA) and the expected payo of the strong player (A) is n n(BB=2BA).
6When BA = nBB, in each battleeld we must employ a tie-breaking rule that selects the stronger player
(A).
11For a proof of Theorem 1 see Roberson (2006). A major part of this proof is establishing
the existence of a pair of n-variate distributions P 
A and P 
B with the prescribed univariate
marginal distribution functions and with supports contained in the feasible sets of force
allocations, SA and SB respectively. Note that uniqueness of the equilibrium expected payos
follows immediately from the fact that the Colonel Blotto game is constant-sum.
In the Colonel Blotto game the primary linkage is an implicit opportunity cost that arises
from the fact that resources which are used in one particular battleeld cannot be used in any
of the other battleelds. As a result, even though resources are use-it-or-lose-it, the implicit
opportunity costs create incentives that behave much like linear costs. In fact, if BB=BA
satises (2=n) < (BB=BA)  1, then the unique set of univariate marginal distributions in
the Colonel Blotto game corresponds to the unique set of univariate marginal distributions in
a game with two unconstrained-budget players and a set of n independent all-pay auctions,
where each auction has value (2=n)BA for player B and value (2=n)(B2
A=BB) for player A.
Another distinctive feature of the equilibria in the asymmetric Colonel Blotto game is that
the disadvantaged player uses a \guerrilla warfare" strategy which involves the stochastic
allocation of zero forces to a subset of the battleelds. Conversely, the player with the larger
budget plays a \stochastic complete coverage" strategy that stochastically allocates forces
across all battleelds, with each battleeld receiving a strictly positive level of forces with
probability one. This feature does not arise under the corresponding game with battleeld
outcomes determined by the lottery CSF.
Friedman (1958) analyzes a Blotto-type game which replaces the auction CSF, of the
original Colonel Blotto game, with the lottery CSF7 and replaces the linear pure-count
objective with a linear count objective and common but heterogeneous battleeld valuations
fvjgn
j=1 (i.e., wi;j = vj for i = A;B and all j). That is, Friedman's Blotto-type game consists
of: (i) the lottery component contest success function, (ii) a linear count objective function
with heterogenous battleeld valuations fvjgn
j=1 that are symmetric across players, and (iii)
budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs with resource constraints BA and BB. Theorem 2
provides Friedman's characterization of equilibrium in this Blotto-type game.
Theorem 2 (Friedman (1958)). The pair of n-tuples x
A and x
B constitutes a Nash equilib-
rium of the Blotto-type game with the lottery CSF, heterogenous battleeld valuations fvjgn
j=1,




 i;j) for r 2 (0;1].
12and budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs with resource constraints BA and BB, if
8 j 2 f1;:::;ng x
A;j = (BA)
vj Pn




The equilibrium expected payos are (BB=(BA + BB))
Pn
j=1 vj for the weak player (B), and
(BA=(BA + BB))
Pn
j=1 vj for the strong player (A).
In the Blotto-type game with lottery CSF, an implicit opportunity cost linkage arises and
each player uses a \deterministic complete coverage" strategy that proportionally allocates
forces based on the relative values of the battleelds. Robson (2005) shows that if the
lottery CSF is replaced by the variation of the Tullock CSF examined in Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1998), then there may exist \non-participation equilibria" in which one or both
players deterministically drop out of a subset of the battleelds. Note, though, that this
deterministic non-participation strategy is qualitatively dierent from the stochastic guerilla
warfare strategy employed by the weaker player in the Colonel Blotto game, in which (only)
the weaker player stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of the battleelds.
3.2 Budget-Constrained Linear Costs
The classic constant-sum formulation of the Colonel Blotto game provides an important
benchmark in the study of strategic multi-dimensional conict. In this formulation, any
unused resources have no value. Kvasov (2007) introduces a non-constant-sum version of
the two-player Colonel Blotto game that relaxes the use-it-or-lose-it feature of the original
formulation and, for the case of symmetric resource endowments, nds that there is a one-to-
one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions
in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Roberson and Kvasov
(2008) extend this analysis to the case of asymmetric resource endowments and nd that |
as long as the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below a threshold | this
relationship between the constant-sum and non-constant-sum games is preserved.
In the taxonomy of section 2, the non-constant-sum formulation of the Colonel Blotto
game utilizes the auction component contest success function, a linear count objective with
n homogenous battleelds of common value v (i.e., wi;j = v for i = A;B and all j), budget-
constrained linear costs with c = 1 and resource constraints BA and BB, BA  BB.
Let b Bi : R4
+ ! R denote player i's modied resource constraint, given by






13for player B, and










for player A. Clearly, BA  BB implies b BA  b BB. In the case that b BB= b BA satises (2=n) <
( b BB= b BA)  1, a modied statement of Theorem 1 | in which each player i's resource
constraint Bi is replaced with his modied resource constraint b Bi | applies. That is, for
(2=n) < ( b BB= b BA)  1 any equilibrium of the constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with n
battleelds and resource constraints b BA(BA;BB;v;n) and b BB(BA;BB;v;n) is an equilibrium
of the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with n battleelds of common value v and
resource constraints BA and BB. See Roberson and Kvasov (2008) for the remaining case
where ( b BB= b BA)  (2=n).
Theorem 3 (Roberson and Kvasov (2008)). If n  3 and b BB= b BA satises (2=n) <
( b BB= b BA)  1, then the pair of n-variate distribution functions P 
A and P 
B constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game (i.e., auction CSF, linear count
objective with common battleeld value v, and budget-constrained linear costs with c = 1 and
resource constraints BA and BB) if and only if it satises the following two conditions: (1)
For each player i, Supp(P 
i )  Si and (2) P 
i , i = A;B, generates the corresponding unique
set of univariate marginal distribution functions fF 
i;jgn
j=1 outlined below.






































Moreover, such a Nash equilibrium exists, and in any Nash equilibrium the expected payo
of the weak player (B) is nv( b BB=2 b BA)  b BB and the expected payo of the strong player (A)
is nv   nv( b BB=2 b BA)   b BA.
The modied budgets delineate the three classes of equilibria in the non-constant-sum
Colonel Blotto game. If b Bi = Bi for each i = A;B, then the players' resource constraints are
so low, that in equilibrium both players expend all of their available resources. Conversely,
if b Bi = (nv=2) for each i = A;B, then the players' resource constraints are so high, that
in equilibrium neither player expends all of his available resources. Lastly, if b BB = BB and
b BA = (nvBB=2)1=2, then the weak player (B) has a resource constraint that binds, but the
strong player (A) has a non-binding resource constraint.
In a similar manner, Friedman's Blotto-type game with the lottery CSF can also be
14extended to allow for budget-constrained linear costs with c = 1. In this case, it is straight-
forward to show that a modied form of Theorem 2 applies in which each player's resource
constraint Bi is replaced with his modied resource constraint dened as:







for player B, and















for player A. As before, BA  BB implies b BA  b BB.
Theorem 4. The pair of n-tuples x
A and x
B constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Blotto-
type game with the lottery CSF, heterogenous battleeld valuations fvjgn
j=1, and budget-
constrained linear costs with c = 1 and resource constraints BA and BB, if
8 j 2 f1;:::;ng x
A;j = ( b BA)
vj Pn
j0=1 vj0 and x
B;j = ( b BB)
vj Pn
j0=1 vj0:
The equilibrium expected payos are ( b BB=( b BA + b BB))
Pn
j=1 vj   b BB for the weak player (B),
and ( b BA=( b BA + b BB))
Pn
j=1 vj   b BA for the strong player (A).
Again, the modied budgets delineate the three classes of equilibria that arise in the
case that unused resources have positive value. As in the constant-sum formulations of
the Colonel Blotto game and Friedman's Blotto-type game, the primary linkage across the
individual component conicts is through the implicit opportunity cost of resources. Thus,
the nature of the incentives in the constant-sum games is, for the most part, robust to the
relaxation of the use-it-or-lose-it cost feature.
3.3 Infrastructure Costs
The case of costs arising from infrastructure investment provides another example of a non-
separable cost function. Recall that by an infrastructure investment, we mean a nontar-
getable force technology that provides a uniform level of force across all battleelds. We also
assume that an investment in infrastructure serves as a perfect substitute for the targetable
force in each battleeld. This assumption allows us to treat the sum of player i's infrastruc-
ture investment and his targeted force to a given battleeld j as a single choice variable b xi;j,
15which we call player i's eective force allocation to battleeld j. It is this allocation that
enters into the contest success function for that battleeld.
Application of this type of nonseparable cost function originates with Lizzeri and Per-
sico (2001), who examine two political parties engaged in redistributive competition with a
continuum of voters, targetable taxes and transfers, and public good provision.8 We follow
Lizzeri and Persico's focus on the case of a zero-one infrastructure technology that, when
employed, provides a uniform level of force across all of the battleelds. However, our re-
sults may be directly extended to allow for a more general lumpy, or discrete, infrastructure
technology.
Consider a game with the auction battleeld contest success function and a linear count
objective function with homogeneous battleelds with common value v. For simplicity we
focus on the asymmetric case in which, both players have linear costs with c = 1, but only
player B has the opportunity to invest in infrastructure. That is, in addition to the direct
targeting of forces, player B has the opportunity to make a zero-one infrastructure investment
(denoted by an indicator function I) at cost cI which provides an eective force allocation of
I to each of the n battleelds. We focus on the case in which the infrastructure investment
is ecient, cI < nI, and the value of each battleeld is larger than the per battleeld
cost of the infrastructure investment, v > (cI=n). If player B utilizes the infrastructure
technology (I = 1), then the total force that player B allocates to each battleeld j is
calculated as the sum of the targetable forces, xB;j, and the infrastructure investment, I.
Let b xB  (xB;1 + II;xB;2 + II;:::;xB;n + II) denote player B's eective force allocation.9
When the two players allocate the same level of eective force, xA;j = b xB;j, to a battleeld
j, player B is assumed to win the battleeld.
It is clear that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for this class of games. For player A, a
mixed strategy is an n-variate distribution function which species player A's randomization
in the allocation of targetable forces across the battleelds. Because (i) player B's eective
force allocation is given by the n-tuple b xB = (xB;1+II;:::;xB;n+II) and (ii) for any n-tuple
of eective forces there exists a unique cost-minimizing combination of the targetable force
and the infrastructure investment, it will be convenient to state player B's mixed strategy
in terms of his n-tuple of eective forces.
8Because the model in Lizzeri and Persico (2001) assumes a continuum of voters, mixed strategies are
unidimensional. A variation of this game with a nite set of voters and multidimensional mixed strategies
is examined in Roberson (2008).
9Under these assumptions, the unit cost of infrastructure investment is cu = (cI=I). This zero-one
infrastructure investment corresponds to a simplied form of infrastructure costs in which the term minj b xB;j
is replaced with I  I, where I takes a value of one if minj b xB;j  I.
16Theorem 5. Assume that v > I > (cI=n) and c = 1. A Nash equilibrium of the game with
asymmetric infrastructure investment is for each player to allocate his forces according to















Similarly for player B's eective force
b P






v if b x 2 f[0;v]n   [I;v]ng
minjfb xjg
v if b x 2 [I;v]n
Player B chooses to make the infrastructure investment with probability 1 
cI=n
v . The expected
payo for player A is 0, and the expected payo for player B is nI   cI.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that this pair of strategies is indeed an equilibrium.
Note also that one may verify that if an n-tuple of eective forces b xB is contained in the
support of player B's mixed strategy (Supp( b PB)), then either i = 0 and the n-tuple of
targetable forces xB is contained in the set [0;(cI=n)]n or i = 1 and the n-tuple of targetable
forces xB is contained in the set xB 2 [0;v   I]n. The linkage in player B's force allocations
arises from the fact that it is suboptimal for player B to choose an n-tuple of targetable forces
xB 2 [(cI=n);I)n and to not make the infrastructure investment, I = 0, a strategy that has
a corresponding cost of
Pn
j=1 xB;j 2 [cI;nI). By choosing to make only the infrastructure
investment, I = 1, at cost cI 
Pn
j=1 xB;j, player B obtains a strictly higher level of eective
force, (I;:::;I) > xB for any xB 2 [(cI=n);I)n. That is, by choosing the infrastructure
investment, I = 1 at cost cI, over an n-tuple of targetable forces xB 2 [(cI=n);I)n (and
no infrastructure investment, I = 0) player B strictly increases his level of eective force,
but does not increase his costs. Then, because in any equilibrium the support of player B's
randomization over eective forces contains no n-tuples b xB in the set [(cI=n);I)n, it follows
directly that for any equilibrium strategy PA for player A, the intersection of Supp(PA) with
[(cI=n);I)n is also necessarily empty.
Intuitively, when player B stochastically employs the infrastructure investment, the fact
that the investment provides an identical (positive) level of force to each battleeld means
that there is automatically a linkage in the eective force allocations across battleelds.
Moreover, this lumpy infrastructure choice also induces correlation in the allocation of the
targetable forces across battleelds. Due to the construction of equilibrium mixed strategies,
17a similar type of correlation structure arises in player A's strategy, despite the fact that he
does not have access to the infrastructure investment.
The intuition of this example also extends to the case of the budget-constrained use-it-or-
lose-it cost structure. As long as we maintain the assumption of an auction contest success
function, the tradeo between targetability and eciency is captured in the endogenous
correlation structure arising in the mixed-strategy equilibria. Under the lottery contest
success function and a linear count objective, equilibrium does not in general require mixed
strategies. As a consequence incorporating infrastructure investments does not lead to the
same tradeo between eciency and targetability that arises with an auction contest success
function. To our knowledge infrastructure investments have not yet been formally examined
in this context, although, due to the non-monotonicity of the cost of providing dierent
eective force levels, we expect a wealth of equilibrium behaviors to arise.
4 Multiple Battleelds with Objective Linkages
The objective function maximized in the standard formulation of the Colonel Blotto game
is the linear pure-count objective. This is only one of many objectives that are relevant
to applications of the model. Consider for example the nonlinear majoritarian objective
in which the overall conict is winner-take-all, and the winner is the player who wins a
majority of battleelds (with n { the number of battleelds { odd). Such structural linkages
may also be asymmetric across the set of players. For example, in the case of the attack
and defense of a network of targets, the loss of a single target, or a particular conguration
of targets, may be sucient to disable the entire network. Thus, the attacker has a best-
shot objective and seeks to destroy any one of the subsets of targets that would disable the
network. Conversely, the defender has a weakest-link objective and seeks to prevent the
network from being disabled.
4.1 Majoritarian Objective
The characterization of Nash equilibrium in the multi-battleeld conict with a majoritarian
objective and an auction battleeld contest success function is largely an open question. Only
the case of three battleelds with symmetric battleeld values and costs has been addressed
in the literature. We begin with the case of linear costs, and then examine the case of
budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs.
18Suppose that the benet from winning a majority of battleelds is symmetric across
players, wA = wb = w = 2 in equation (3), and that players have symmetric linear costs
with c = 1. Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a) provide an equilibrium which is summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a)). Let the tetrahedron T be dened by the convex
hull of the four points (1;1;0), (1;0;1), (0;1;1), and (0;0;0). A Nash equilibrium of the
symmetric majoritarian objective game with n = 3, w = 2, linear costs with c = 1, and
the auction CSF is for each player to allocate his forces as follows. Each player draws 3-
tuples, (x1;x2;x3), from the uniform probability measure on the surface S of T and allocates
resources according to ((x1)2;(x2)2;(x3)2). The equilibrium expected payo to each player is
0.
Although in Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a) each battleeld is modeled as a standard
rst-price (winner-pay) auction, one can appeal to Szentes's (2005) result on transforming
an equilibrium strategy prole from one auction to another in order to solve for the case
of sunk expenditure. Given the transformation from the equilibrium strategy prole in the
rst-price winner-pay auction to that in an all-pay auction, the proof of Theorem 6 follows
along the line of argument for the rst-price auction given in Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a).
In the following discussion we provide only a brief sketch of the proof of Theorem 6. Let P 
denote the trivariate joint distribution function generated by the randomization described
above, and let F 
j;j0 denote P 's bivariate marginal distribution function for battleelds j and
j0. For any allocation of resources ((x1)2;(x2)2;(x3)2) 2 R3
+, the probability that player i






























where the last term corrects for the fact that the probability that player i wins all three
battleelds is counted three times, once in each of the three bivariate marginal distributions.
As Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a) show, for any x on the surface S of the tetrahedron T,
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It then follows that for any (x1;x2;x3) on the surface S, player i's expected payo from the

























which is equal to zero. Ruling out protable deviations to 3-tuples outside of the surface S
is more involved. For further details see Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a).
In the case of the symmetric Colonel Blotto majority game with n = 3 (i.e., auction
CSF, majoritarian objective, and budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs with symmetric
resource constraints BA = BB = B), any solution to the pure count objective game is also
a solution to the majoritarian objective game (see Borel and Ville 1938). To see this note
that as a result of the symmetric resource constraint and the fact that each player uses all of
his available resources, each player wins at least one battleeld. Formally, let Pi be a mixed
strategy in which Supp(Pi)  S  fx 2 R3
+j
P3
j=1 xj = Bg and which does not place strictly
positive mass on any n-tuple. If player i is playing such a mixed strategy Pi, then for all
budget-balancing n-tuples of resources x i 2 S the probability that player  i wins all three
battleelds, Pi(x i;1;x i;2;x i;3), is equal to zero.10 Let Fi;j;j0 denote Pi's bivariate marginal
distribution function for battleelds j and j0. Because for all budget-balancing resource
allocations no player wins all three battleelds (i.e., Pi(x1;x2;x3) = 0 for all x 2 S), it
follows that if player i uses the strategy Pi with Supp(Pi)  S and player  i uses any
n-tuple x 2 S then11
Fi;1(x1) + Fi;2(x2) + Fi;3(x3)   Fi;2;3(x2;x3)   Fi;1;2(x1;x2)   Fi;1;3(x1;x3) = 1:
10Intuitively, if Supp(Pi)  S, then for all x i 2 S the measure of the support of Pi over the 3-box
[0;x i;1]  [0;x i;2]  [0;x i;3] is necessarily zero. It is also clear that this does not apply if BA > BB.
11This expression is for the case that a tie occurs with probability zero. It is straightforward to incorporate
a tie-breaking rule into this expression. However, it is clear that in any equilibrium ties occur with probability
zero.








= Fi;2;3(x2;x3) + Fi;1;2(x1;x2) + Fi;1;3(x1;x3):









= Fi;1(x1) + Fi;2(x2) + Fi;3(x3)   1:
Suppose player i employs an equilibrium strategy P 
i with the corresponding unique set
of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions given in Theorem 1 for the Colonel Blotto
































for all budget-balancing resource allocations x. Because the game is constant sum and
symmetric (with value w), it follows that this is also an equilibrium of the majority game.
The majoritarian game with the auction CSF and three battleelds has been extended
in several directions. Laslier (2003) examines a variant of the symmetric Blotto majority
game in which the three battleelds enter into the critical value count function with diering
weights. Weinstein (2005) provides bounds on the equilibrium payos in the Blotto majority
game with asymmetric budgets. Lastly, it should also be noted that it is straightforward to
demonstrate that the relationship between the Colonel Blotto game and the non-constant-
sum formulation of the Colonel Blotto game (Kvasov 2007, Roberson and Kvassov 2008) may
be extended to examine a non-constant-sum formulation of the symmetric Blotto majority
game with budget-constrained linear costs. In particular in the case of three homogenous
battleelds and symmetric budget-constrained linear costs with resource constraint B 
(w=2) and c = 1, any equilibrium of the symmetric Colonel Blotto pure-count objective
game is an equilibrium of the symmetric Blotto majority game with budget-constrained
linear costs.
Under the Tullock contest success function (see footnote 7), Snyder (1989) and Klumpp
and Polborn (2006) examine a symmetric game with the majoritarian objective (wA = wB =
21w) and linear costs (c = 1).12 Consider the special case of the lottery CSF and an odd
number of battleelds. For any collection C of battleelds, the probability that player i wins


















and player i's expected payo is given by




Theorem 7 addresses the special case of the symmetric majoritarian game with the lottery
CSF and linear costs. See Snyder (1989) and Klumpp and Polborn (2006) for the case of the
Tullock CSF.
Theorem 7. Suppose the number of battleelds n is odd. In the symmetric majoritarian
game with wA = wB = w, linear costs with c = 1, and the lottery CSF:
1. [Snyder(1989)] There exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for n  5. Any pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium (x
A;x
B) satises























2. [Klumpp and Polborn (2006)] There exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for n  7.
In any mixed strategy equilibrium players randomize over allocations that are uniform
across battleelds (i.e. of the form (x;x;:::;x)) and earn expected payos equal to 0.
A symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
As a point of reference, in the case of a single symmetric contest with common value v,
linear costs with c = 1, and the lottery CSF, each player i's equilibrium resource allocation
12Snyder (1989) examines a CSF in which the Tullock CSF is a special case.
22is xi = (v=4). In any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the majoritarian objective game,
part 1 of Theorem 7 shows that each player i's resource allocation to battleeld j is equal to
(w=4) times the probability that battleeld j is pivotal, where the probability that battleeld
j is pivotal is equal to the probability that player i wins exactly (n 1)=2 of the other n 1
battleelds. In a symmetric equilibrium each player wins each battleeld with probability
(1=2), and thus, the probability that player i wins exactly (n   1)=2 of the other n   1

















As Klumpp and Polborn (2006) show, for n  7, the expected payos given in part 1 of
Theorem 7 are strictly negative, and thus, there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
over this parameter range. The intuition for this is that increasing the number of battleelds
n essentially reduces the level of noise in the overall contest because the randomization in
the lottery CSF is independent across battleelds. As in a single contest with the Tullock
CSF, pure-strategy equilibria fail to exist once the value of the CSF is suciently sensitive to
the players' relative resource allocations.14 For n  7, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) provide
a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which players randomize over allocations of the
form (x;x;:::;x) that are uniform across battleelds. These equilibria involve full rent
dissipation.
The majoritarian objective is only one of many possible critical-value pure-count objec-
tives. The case of a critical-value pure-count objective with the critical value m = n   1
(i.e., success requires winning all but one battleeld) and with a sucient number of players
(strictly greater than two) is examined by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003b), who characterize
an equilibrium. For the case of three battleelds, a critical value of m = 2 corresponds
to the majoritarian objective, but with four or more battleelds the m = n   1 critical
value is more closely related to the weakest-link objective in that success requires winning a
super-majority of the battleelds.
13Using Stirling's formula for factorials, this pivot probability is approximately equal to [((n 1)=2)] 1=2,
which approaches zero as n becomes arbitrarily large, but, as discussed in Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981),
the rate of convergence is relatively slow.
14For a two-player symmetric contest with Tullock CSF and linear costs this arises when the exponent r
is geater than 2. See Baye et al. (1994) and Alcalde and Dahm (2010).
234.2 Weakest-Link and Best-Shot Objectives
A line of research that examines games of attack and defense with multiple battleelds
in which the players have asymmetric objective functions includes Gross (1950), Cooper
and Restrepo (1967), Shubik and Weber (1981), Coughlin (1992), and Clark and Konrad
(2007).15 For example, Clark and Konrad (2007) use the terms weakest-link objective and
best-shot objective to describe the objectives of a defender and an attacker, respectively,
who face each other in a network of battleelds in which successful defense requires that
all targets within the network be successfully defended and successful attack requires only
that at least one battleeld be won.16 The combination of the weakest-link and best-shot
objectives accurately captures the attack and defense of a network consisting of numerous
individual components but in which the failure or loss of a single component may be sucient
to disable the network. Such linkages arise in a number of infrastructure networks including
electrical power grids, oil pipelines, transportation systems, communication systems, and
cyber security.
Consider a game with n battleelds, an attacker with the best-shot objective, a defender
with the weakest-link objective, and linear costs with c = 1. Let A denote the attacker who
obtains a payo of wA if he wins one or more battleelds, and B denote the defender who
obtains a payo of wB if he wins every battleeld. In the case that the players allocate the
same level of resources to a battleeld, we assume that the defender wins the battleeld.
We begin with the case in which in each battleeld the probability that player i wins is
determined by the auction CSF, and then examine the case of the lottery CSF.
Under the auction CSF it is clear that there is no pure strategy equilibrium for this class
of games. As before a mixed strategy, or distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate
distribution function Pi : Rn
+ ! [0;1]. The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Kovenock and
Roberson (2009). This theorem examines the game in which wB  nwA. The discussion
following Theorem 8 also provides a summary of the equilibria in the remaining parameter
15Also related is the literature on terrorism and optimal defensive strategies (for a survey see Sandler and
Enders (2004) or Kardes and Hall (2005)). Within this literature the focus is typically on attack and defense
in the case that the attacker's objective is to successfully attack one target, rather than a subset of targets, and
the defender's objective is to successfully defend all targets (see for example Bier, Oliverios, and Samuelson
(2007) and Powell (2007a, b)). However, that literature diers from the formulation examined in this article
in that the attacker's strategy space is restricted to choosing which single target to attack (or mixed strategies
that are a probability distributions across targets). In contrast, the contest structure examined in this article
allows the attacker to endogenously choose how many targets to attack, the correlation of attacks, and the
level of force used in each attack.
16See also Hirshleifer (1983) who coins the terms \best-shot" and \weakest-link" in the context of voluntary
provision of public goods.
24congurations.
Theorem 8 (Kovenock and Roberson (2009)). Consider an n-battleeld game of attack and
defense in which player A has a best-shot objective and valuation wA, player B has a weakest-
link objective and valuation wB, both players have linear costs with c = 1, and battleeld
outcomes are determined by the auction CSF. If wB  nwA, then a Nash equilibrium of the
game is for each player to allocate his forces according to the following n-variate distribution



















minfx1 + x2 + ::: + xng
wA
The expected payo for player A is 0, and the expected payo for player B is wB   nwA.
It is useful to provide some intuition for Theorem 8. Recall that in a weakest-link network
of n-targets the attacker need only win one target within the network in order to win the
network and receives no additional benet from winning more than one target. In the
equilibrium characterized in Theorem 8, for any realization of his random allocation xA, the
attacker optimally allocates a strictly positive level of force to at most one target within the
network. Given the defender's equilibrium distribution of force, the attacker receives a lower
expected payo from attacking more than one target. Although in equilibrium the attacker
randomizes choosing each target with equal probability, the attacker's allocation of force to
the target chosen varies stochastically in magnitude. Kovenock and Roberson (2009) show
that this single attack property in which the attacker allocates a strictly positive level of
force to at most one target applies to all Nash equilibria of the game in Theorem 8. They
also extend the analysis to all other parameter congurations and to the case in which the
game of attack and defense is over a weakest-link supra-network of best-shot and weakest-link
networks.
The version of this game with lottery CSFs is analyzed by Clark and Konrad (2007) and
for wB > (n 1)wA, equilibrium is characterized by Theorem 9 below. See Clark and Konrad
(2007) for the remaining case that wB  (n   1)wA.
Theorem 9 (Clark and Konrad (2007)). Consider an n-battleeld game of attack and defense
in which player A has a best-shot objective and valuation wA, player B has a weakest-link
25objective and valuation wB, both players have linear costs with c = 1, and battleeld outcomes
are determined by the lottery CSF. If wB  (n 1)wA, then the n-tuples x
A and x
B constitute
a Nash equilibrium of the game if







Both players have strictly positive expected payos in equilibrium.
The primary dierence in the equilibrium behaviors described in Theorems 8 and 9 is
that under the auction CSF the attacker, by attacking at most one target, randomizing
over the identity of the target attacked, and randomizing over the size of the force used in
the attack, optimally chooses to use a type of "stochastic guerilla warfare" strategy. The
defender, although choosing to cover every target with a common, positive force level, also
randomizes over the size of the force allocated. In contrast, under the lottery CSF, the noise
in the outcome conditional on allocations is sucient to eliminate the need to randomize
over allocations. Even though a successful attack requires only that a single target in the
weakest-link network be disabled, the attacker employs a pure strategy that allocates a
strictly positive common level of force to every target. The defender responds in kind.
4.3 Multiple Inputs
In modeling multiple battleelds we have assumed that the outcome in each component
contest j is determined solely by the one-dimensional resource allocated by each player to
that contest and a contest-specic random variable e !j.17 There are also many instances
in which the outcome in a component contest is determined by the interaction of multiple
inputs. Golman and Page (2009) examine a game with budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it
costs and an augmented linear pure-count objective that sums the n battleeld outcomes
and the outcomes of additional contests formed by taking subsets of the n battleelds and
setting each player's allocation equal to the product of his allocations to battleelds in the
subset. For example, consider a variant of the linear pure-count objective that has been
augmented to allow for (n
2) additional contests formed by taking all pairs of battleelds. In
each of the additional contests, denoted by j;k, the outcome is determined by the auction
contest success function applied to the allocations xA;j  xA;k and xB;j  xB;k. The outcome
17The one exception is the case of infrastructure costs, in which two perfectly substitutable inputs are
collapsed into a one-dimensional allocation.









pA;j;k(xA;j  xA;k;xB;j  xB;k);
where pA;j(xA;j;xB;j) denotes the auction contest success function in component contest
j. This variation of the multiple battleeld model results in a constant-sum game with
valuation n + (n
2). Golman and Page (2009) show that although there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in this variation of the game with the (n
2) additional contests, there does
exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to the corresponding game in which there is one
contest for each of the possible nonempty subsets of the n allocations.
Also related is Arbatskaya and Mialon (2010) who examine a single contest with linear
costs in which a Cobb-Douglas production function is used to map multiple inputs (or \ac-
tivities") into an aggregate eort variable that is, in turn, entered into the lottery contest
success function. Inputs may enter the production function asymmetrically and unit costs
may dier across both inputs and players. In the model, placing a common, binding cap on
each player's use of a given input tends to decrease the discriminatory power of the contest,
thereby softening competition. At the same time, the cap may alter the relative strengths of
the players. Because symmetry between players tends to increase competition, this may have
an osetting eect. As a consequence, unless the cap makes the conict more symmetric, it
tends to reduce rent dissipation.
5 Conclusion
Despite the signicant progress since Borel's (1921) foundational model, the study of multi-
battleeld conict remains an area with important open theoretical problems and potentially
large returns to new conceptual formulations, practical application, and empirical testing.
Space constraints have prevented us from examining many important extensions of the basic
models described in this chapter. We briey discuss a few of these here.
First, it is obvious that other contest success functions may be applied within battleelds
such as the Tullock contest success functions with exponent greater than two,18 Lazear and
Rosen's (1981) dierence-form contest success functions,19 Konrad's (2002) treatment of
18In the case of a single contest, partial characterizations of equilibrium for this model for discrete ap-
proximations to a continuous strategy space have been derived by Baye et al. (1994) and Alcalde and Dahm
(2010).
19Previous analyses of the Lazear-Rosen (1981) dierence-form contest success function for single contests
27ane handicapping in the context of the auction CSF, or Skaperdas and Syropoulos's (1998)
treatment of weighted asymmetric lottery CSFs. These last two contest success functions
may be particularly useful in the analysis of conicts in which each rival is advantaged in
subsets of the battleelds (perhaps due to geography or pre-conict investment in defensive
position).
Moreover, although the existing literature has led us to frame the general problem of
conict with multiple battleelds as one with sunk costs of contesting and xed prizes for
winning each battleeld, other formulations of the contest within each battleeld are useful.
One important case is that of count objectives in which individual battleeld values are
dependent on the forces of the two players expended in the battleeld. For instance the
game with a linear count objective, auction contest success function, and budget-constrained
linear costs can be altered so that the victor in each each battleeld has a portion of his own
expenditure above that of his rival reimbursed. When the portion of the victor's expenditure
above that of his rival is completely reimbursed, the contest within each battleeld resembles
a war of attrition with a constraint across battleelds on the sum of own bids.20
Previous work on multi-battleeld conicts has focused almost exclusively on two-player
games. The characterization of equilibrium for n > 2 players engaged in conict is of
great interest. A wide array of issues arise n-player extensions that are either absent or
unimportant in two-player games, including the exogenous or endogenous segmentation of
conict as well as the possibility that identity-dependent externalities may exist with respect
to the overall contest winners or the winners of individual battleelds.
Friedman (1958) examines an n-player extension of the model described in Theorem 2,
which employs a lottery contest success function, a linear count objective with heterogeneous
battleeld valutions that are symmetric across players, and asymmetric budget constrained
use-it-or-lose-it costs. He nds that each player allocates the same fraction of their respective
budgets to a given battleeld and this fraction is the ratio of the battleeld value to the sum of
generally assume sucient noise in the outcome and/or concavity of utility or convexity of cost to insure
a pure strategy equilibrium. However, pure strategy equilibria do not generally exist for all specications
of noise and costs and the characterization of equilibrium in these models is incomplete. See for example
Che and Gale (2000), who provide a partial characterization of the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
with a specic type of exogenous noise. Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996) employ the Lazear-Rosen CSF
to model political competition across multiple battleelds.Their model may be interpreted as multi-battle
conict with a linear count objective and budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs. See also Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987) and Cox and McCubbins (1986).
20Standard (single battle) contests with rank-order externalites from rival bids have been analyzed by
Baye et al. (2010) for the auction contest success fucntion and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2010) for the
lottery contest success function.
28battleeld values. An initial approach to the analysis of n-player multi-battleeld conicts
with an auction contest success function is Kovenock and Roberson's (2008b) analysis of
the symmetric n player Colonel Blotto game with a linear pure-count objective. In this
extension, not only do equilibria exist in which each player competes in every battleeld,
but segmented equilibria exist in which disjoint subsets of players in a partition of the
set of np players are matched with disjoint subsets of battleelds in a partition of the nb
battleelds. In these segmented equilibria, each subset of players competes only for those
battleelds in the matched subset of battleelds. Kovenock and Roberson also show that a
type of segmented equilibrium exists with asymmetric budgets.
Multi-battleeld conicts with incomplete information also remain relatively neglected.
Natural candidates for parameters that are private information are parameters of the play-
ers' objective functions such as battleeld valuations or parameters of cost, such as budget
constraints or unit cost of expenditures. To our knowledge, little work has been published to
date in this area. Exceptions are Matros (2008) and Adamo and Matros (2009) who examine,
under the lottery and auction CSFs respectively, games with a linear count objective that
is symmetric across players and budget-constrained use-it-or-lose-it costs, where the players'
budgets are private information.
All of the models examined in this chapter have involved a single stage with simultaneous
moves. The introduction of dynamics into the analysis can take several forms. First, the
assumption that the battleelds are contested simultaneously can be relaxed. Models in
which battleelds are contested sequentially include Harris and Vickers (1987), Klumpp and
Polborn (2006) and Agastya and McAfee (2006), Konrad and Kovenock (2005, 2009) and Sela
(2008). The assumption that the contest within a given battleeld involves a simultaneous
one-shot expenditure can also be relaxed. Alternating move models of sunk expenditure
within a single contest environment in the spirit of the Shubik \Dollar Auction Game" (see
O'Neill (1986) and Leininger (1989, 1991)) have been extended to cover multiple battleeld
conicts (in the context of vote buying) by Dekel et al. (2008, 2009).21 Finally, the fact
that the main results of this chapter provide equilibrium payos in terms of exogenous
parameters such as resource budgets, number of battleelds, values of battleelds, unit
costs of expenditures, and network structures, facilitates the use of these models as the
nal stage of multistage games in which these values are determined endogenously. This
opens up a conict theoretic framework with which to generate equilibrium models of the
endogenous determination of the conguration of battleelds (including endogenous network
21See Konrad's chapter in this volume for more on dynamic conicts.
29structures and network redundancies),22 resources constraints and cost structures,23 and
coalition formation.24
In concluding, we note that the process of empirically testing the equilibrium predictions
of the models described in this chapter has already begun. Several variants of the Colonel
Blotto game described in section 3 have been examined experimentally by Avrahami and
Kareev (2009), Arad and Rubinstein (2009), and Chowdhury, Kovenock and Sheremeta
(2009). The game of attack and defense with weakest link and best-shot objectives in section
4.2 has been examined by Kovenock, Roberson and Sheremeta (2009). Clearly, at this time,
this remains a relatively untouched area of research.
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